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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN
M. CLAWSON, his wife; TEX R.
OLSEN and MONNA LEE OLSEN,
his wife; and KEN CHAMBERLAIN and JEANNINE W. CHAMBERLAIN, his wife,
'*<
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 13653

—vs.—
BRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH
ANNE MOESSER, husband and wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
James Gr. and Joan M. Clawson and others, the
Plaintiffs and Respondents (hereinafter referred to as
"CLAWSON") acquired record ownership of the lands
in dispute which were at that time subject to a trust
deed granted by their predecessors. The trust deed was
thereafter foreclosed as a mortgage, the property sold
and lawfully redeemed from the sale. The mortgagee instituted a second sale on its deficiency. Bruce L. and
Ruth Anne Moesser, the Defendants and Appellants
(hereinafter referred to as "MOESSERS") purchased
1
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at the second sale. Clawson obtained a decree quieting
title against Moesser on the Trial Court's determination
that the mortgage lien could not be foreclosed twice
under those facts.
DISPOSITION IN LOWEE COURT
Both sides acknowledged that the facts are not in dispute and each moved for a summary judgment (R. 9-33
and R. 74). The Trial Court granted Clawson's motion,
denied Moesser s' motion and ordered Clawson to reimburse Moessers for the 1973 property taxes (R. 99-105).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Clawson seeks to have the Trial Court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute:
In 1965 Mid-Continent Construction Company acquired the real property (R. 44). In 1966 Mid-Continent
and C. H. Spaulding granted to Walker Bank and Trust
Company ("Walker Bank") a Trust Deed securing
promissory notes of both trustors with the property (R.
46-48). ••";;;•
• -**>«**On November 19, 1968 Clawson obtained a judgment
•against both Mid-Continent and Spaulding which he
docketed in Sanpete County (R. 50).
Clawson pursued his judgment by execution sale
held April 10, 1969 at which he purchased the property
(R. 50, 51).

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Upon expiration of six months and no redemption
following the sale, Clawson obtained a Sheriff's Deed
dated October 20, 1969 (R. 54, 55).
On August 1, 1969 Walker Bank commenced foreclosure of its trust deed as a mortgage 1 (R, 52).
The parties agree and the Court found (R. 101) that
Clawson then held fee simple title to the land subject
only to the Trust Deed, and! the parties stipulated to
this priority in time (R. 56).
Neither Clawson nor any other Plaintiff was a party to
or bound by Walker Bank's Trust Deed or the notes
it secured (R. 48).
On November 6, 1969 Walker Bank obtained a
Decree of Foreclosure (R. 15-18) which did not purport
to determine any title other than to adjudicate that the
Trust Deed was a paramount lien on the real property
(R. 17). I t did not hold, and could not have held, Clawson
liable on the underlying obligation (R. 48) nor did it
attack Clawson's title in any way (R. 15-18). Walker
Bank's Decree of Foreclosure was an express order to
sell the premises and to assess a deficiency, if any, against
only Spaulding and Mid-Continent (R.17). The sale was
held November 6, 1969 and the premises were sold to
Keith G. McArthur (R. 20).
1

An election permitted under Section 57-1-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
:•',
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Spaulding, one of the deficiency judgment debtors,
redeemed the Walker Bank sale (R. 24), although he
had not done so from the previous Clawson sale (R. 54,
55). This left Clawson with unencumbered fee title as our
legal argument will develop.
Spaulding, upon redeeming from Walker Bank's sale
on June 30, 1970 (R. 24), immediately attempted to sell
whatever he thought he may have taken from that redemption to Cameo Minerals, apparently a corporation
(R. 65) from which nothing further is heard.
Walker Bank filed a deficiency judgment against
Mid-Continent and Spaulding on January 22, 1970 (R.
21,22).
Then three years later, on February 12,1973, Walker
Bank procured a Writ of Execution — not an order of
sale or further proceedings in its mortgage foreclosure
—on its deficiency judgment against Mid-Continent and
Spaulding (R. 25, 26). And it is significant that Walker
Bank did not seek or obtain a supplemental decree of
foreclosure or order of sale (or "special execution" as
is provided in Section 78-37-1, UCA 1953 affecting foreclosure of real estate morgtages) but obtained all Walker
Bank was entitled to: a writ directed against any assets
of Mid-Continent and Spaulding or either of them (R.
25, 26). The sheriff executed on Clawson's property.
At the Execution Sale of March 21, 1973 Moesser
paid $4,100.00 for Mid-Contineinit's and Spaulding's interest, if any, in the property (R. 27, 28) and recorded a
Sheriff's Deed six months thereafter (R, 32, 33).

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Clawson paid taxes for the years 1969, 1970, 1971
and 1972 and offered to pay those taxes for 1973 but
Moesseiy claiming under the Sheriff's Deed, paid 1973
taxes (E. 12) which one year's taxes the Trial Court
ordered Clawson to reimburse to Moesser (E. 105).
The chronology of events is critical to a disposition
of the case, and since those facts are also complicated,
we haye sub-joined a columnar statement of events in
the order of their occurrence:

%

5
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Chain of Events Under
Which Moessers Claim

Date of
Event or
Proceeding

MID-CONTINENT & SPAULDING
OBTAIN T I T L E (R44)

Oct. 1, '65

MID-CONTINENT & SPAULDING
GRANT T R U S T D E E D TO
WALKER BANK (R46)

Sep. 8, '66

Chain of Title and Events Under
Which Clawsons Claim
MID-CONTINENT &
SPAULDING OBTAIN
T I T L E (R44)

CLAWSON T A K E S J U D G M E N T
Nov. 19, '69 AGAINST MID-CONTINENT &
SPAULDING (R50) See Note 1
CLAWSON PURCHASES A T
Apr. 10, '69 EXECUTION
SALE (R50)
WALKER BANK COMMENCES
FORECLOSURE OF I T S T R U S T
D E E D AS A MORTGAGE (R52)

Aug. 1, '69

Oct. 20, '69

CLAWSON RECEIVES
S H E R I F F ' S D E E D FOLLOWING
NO R E D E M P T I O N D U R I N G 6
MOS. PERIOD (R54)

WALKER BANK FORECLOSURE
ORDER E N T E R E D (R 15-18)

Nov. 6, '69

FORECLOSURE SALE ON
WALKER BANK MORTGAGEK E I T H Mc ARTHUR
PURCHASES (R20)

Dec. 30, '69

WALKER BANK T A K E S
DEFICIENCY J U D G M E N T
(R21,22)

Jan. 22, 7 0

SPAULDING R E D E E M S FROM
McARTHUR (R23,24)

Jun. 28, 7 0

SPAULDING R E D E E M S FROM
McARTHUR (R23)

Jul. 28, 7 0

CLAWSON CONVEYS TO
H I M S E L F AND T H E O T H E R
P L A I N T I F F S (R66)

WALKER BANK CAUSES
ISSUANCE OF GENERAL
EXECUTION ON I T S
DEFICIENCY [Not an order of
;ale or further proceedings in its
foreclosure action] (R25,26)

Feb. 12, 7 3
..•'"jf/ "

i * '

'.{.

\'}•'':

EXECUTION SALE ON WALKER
3ANK GENERAL EXECUTIONMar. 21, 7 3
tf OESSERS PURCHASE (R27,28)
SHERIFF'S D E E D TO
MOESSERS (R32,33)

Sep. 24, 7 3

STote 1. One critical statement of fact in Appellants' brief requires correction. The
ast paragraph on p. 3 contains a statement that, "On April 10, 1969, the Clawsons had
executed on a judgment against C. H. Spaulding." The record is clear that Clawson's
udgment was against C. H. Spaulding and Mid-Continent Construction Company
R. 50,100).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
Wo do not necessarily address Appellants' arguments in the order presented in their brief because, as we
will demonstrate, the considerations in Point I following
treat the exclusive point of significance. These considerations are only discussed fleetingly near the end of
Appellants* brief.
>r r
PQINTiI.
ONCE THE PROPERTY HAS BEEN SOLD ON A
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND REDEEMED
FROM THAT SALE, THE MORTGAGEE CANNOT
COMPEL A SECOND SALE FOR A DEFICENCY
WHERE THE PROPERTY HAS PASSED FROM
THE MORTGAGOR TO A PERSON NOT LIABLE ON
THE MORTGAGE DEBT.

This case involves a single issue of law. If the Court
adopts our statement of Point I then nothing elsewhere
in this or in Appellants' brief requires consideration.
Every jurisdiction treating this issue in the western
United States (where the equivalent of Utah's statutes
on foreclosure, execution and redemption has been extensively borrowed from California's early civil code)
agrees with the proposition we have stated at the heading
of this point.
!

3MV.5TO

Utah's first code, the Revised Statutes of 1898, reflects in Sections 3261 and 3262 that they were borrowed
from California's Code of Civil Procedure, Sections
701 and 702. These sections of Utah's Revised Statutes
of 1898, materially and effectively unchanged, are carried into Rule 69(f)(1) through (4) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
7
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The Supreme Court of the State of California in the
1878 case of Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal. 644 (prior to
P2d), interpreting its Code of Civil Procedure, Sections
701 and 702, held that a successor in interest of a judgment debtor takes free and clear of the mortgage lien
where the property has been sold and then redeemed from
sale. Cited and followed extensively, that rule has never
been modified (Salsbery vs. Ritter, 48 Cal. 2d 1, 306 P2d
897) [1957].
The State of Utah, having borrowed those statutes
after Simpson vs. Castle was decided, should be presumed
to have adopted also the construction placed upon it by
the Court of the author state. Donahue vs. Warner Bros.,
2 U2d 256, 272 P2d 177. See also 82 CJS p. 860, Statutes,
Sec. 372.
But aside from that rule of statutory construction,
there are compelling, logical and persuasive considerations of public policy which galvanize soundness of the
Castle rule.
The Montana Supreme Court in McQueeney vs.
Toomey, 36 Mont. 282, 92 P 561, adopted the Simpson
vs. Castle rule saying:
Our code provisions are, in substance, and almost word for word, like those of California which
had been construed there before their adoption
here, and we took them with the interpretation
placed upon them by the Supreme Court of California.
The Nevada Supreme Court has been the last to
speak on this subject and held in Kaye vs. United Mortgage Co., 466 P2d 848, 86 Nev. 183 (1970):
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Since Nevada statutory provisions governing
redemption are identical in all material respects
to California Code provisions, we are persuaded,
as was Montana, to follow relevant case authority.
For almost a century it has been the law of California that when the right to redeem has been
exercised by a successor in interest to the judgment debtor, title is vested in such successor free
of the lien created by the judgment. [Citing California cases from 1878 to 1967].
This rule serves to promote one of the primary
purposes of statutory redemption in forcing the
purchaser at execution sale to bid in the property at a price approximating its fair value.
[Citing Salsbery vs. Bitter, 48 Cal. 2d 1, 306 P2d
897 (1957)].
I n Damascus Milk Co. vs. Morriss, 463 P2d 212, 1
Wash. App. 501, the Appellate Division of Washington
adopted the same reasoning and the same result.
Oregon has developed the same conclusion in a series
of widely cited decisions beginning with Flanders vs.
Aumack, 32 Ore. 19, 51 P 447, holding that once a mortgage has operated to produce a sale of the premises it
(the mortgage) has fully spent its force, and coming
down to the celebrated case of TJlrich vs. Lincoln Realty
Co., 175 P2d 149, 180 Ore. 380, which holds:
I t has long been the rule of this state that in a
mortgage foreclosure suit, when the decree is had
and the property sold to satisfy it, the mortgagee
has obtained all he contracted for. As this Court
said in Flanders vs. Aumack, 32 Ore. 19, 51 P
447, U A redemption will not reinstate a specific
mortgage lien".
9
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The Ulrich case offers the legally distinguishing
statement that if the real property is still in the hands
of the mortgagor when a deficiency judgment is entered
then the lien of that deficiency would attach to the
property once more, with which we cannot but agree.
However, the Court adds:
>
*• * * but if the lien of the personal judgment has
never attached by reason of the mortgagor not
g^^avipg the fee of the property at the time it was
rendered, there never existed any lien to be reinstated against the successor in interest who
purchased prior to the decree (175 P2d at p. 150).

iU,

Neither Clawson nor his successors in interest signed
the Walker Bank Trust Deed; none was obligated on the
indebtedness secured thereby (R. 46-48).
To examine the history of Utah's redemption statute
will disclose that in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898,
by Sections 3261 through 3263, Utah borrowed word for
word California Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 701
through 703. Those Utah sections were carried into Title
104-37-30 of the Utah Codes of 1933 and 1943 from Sections 6941-6943 of the 1917 Revised Statutes, and have
not been in any material way altered through adoption
of the 1951 Judicial Code and promulgation of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure where those provisions were
then substantially and without any change in meaning
or effect embodied in Rule 69(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus Utah still has the old California
Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 701 et seq.

10
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The landmark and consistently followed California
case of Simpson vs. Castle (supra) draws this conclusion:
[Discussing California Code of Civil Procedure
Sections 701-703]
In case of a redemption by the judgment-debtor
or mortgagor, the effect of the sale is extinguished
and the statute declares he is restored to his estate
in the land, which then, for the first time, becomes
subject to the lien of the unsatisfied 'portion of
th^ judgment. This lifeh attaches thfen because
the effect of the sale has been extinguished, and
the mortgagor or the judgment-debtor is the
owner of the estate as though no sale had been
made. But if he had conveyed his interest in the
land before redemption and his grantee had redeemed, no interest remained in the mortgagor
or judgment-debtor on which the lien could operate unless it be on the theory that the unsatisfied
portion of the judgment was a lien on the land
before the redemption and the grantee of the mortgagor or judgment-debtor took his conveyance
subject to that lien—a theory which finds no support in the statute, [emphasis added]
Clawson's case is even stronger. He had acquired
fee title before the foreclosure proceedings were ever
commenced by Walker Bank.
Michigan Law Review, Volume XXIII, No. 8, June
1925, contains a learned treatise by a professor and a
graduate entitled "Redemption from Foreclosure Sale
and the Uniform Mortgage Act". At page 851 the authors
observe:
We have seen that the principal purpose of the
redemption statute, and the only purpose which
it serves in a superior way, is the encouragement
11
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of adequate bidding at the sale. Obviously this
purpose is defeated by holding that liens are revived, or that a deficiency decree will effectively
charge the land. Putting ourselves again in the
position of the senior lienor on the eve of Ids sale,
we see that he might reason that a purchase by
him at a bargain price would be advantageous
if no redemption took place, and that it would do
him no harm if redemption were made by the
owner. Furthermore, the revival of liens must
tend to discourage redemption by the owner, thus
diminishing the threat from this preferred bidder.
Clearly a better psychological effect upon lienors
would be produced by a rule that redemption by
the owner does not revive liens but contrariwise,
unless the redemptioner be personally liable, will
put the land wholly beyond their reach. Nor would
this be unfair to lienors, for they cannot reasonably have expected, unless the statute has promised it to them, any more than the proceeds of a
single sale of the property* * * *
[The senior lienor] is the likeliest bidder and
he should be subjected to pressure to bid the property up to its value, at least to the amount of his
lien. Hence, his lien should be extinguished.

In Chicago-Kent Law Review, Volume 121, beginning
at page 202, there is a discussion of the law of Illinois,
specifically the decision in Johnson vs. Zahn, 380 111. 320,
44 NE2d 15. That ease holds that the purchaser of a mortgagor's interest (even in a purchase made after foreclosure sale and deficiency decree) takes, upon redemption, the property free from any encumbrance by reason
of the deficiency decree.
The note observes that the result is not unexpected
and is desirable from the standpoint of settled law and
12
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from fairness in protecting the rights of debtor as well as
junior lienholders and, above all, purchasers from the
mortgagor.
In Volume 27 (1948) of the Oregon Law Review, beginning at page 139, there is an extensive note and comment on the effect of redemption, tracing the history of
Oregon Supreme Court decisions. The conclusion reached
is that even though Oregon has a statute which provides
that in an execution sale, as opposed to a mortgage foreclosure sale, the judgment will subsist as a lien to the
extent of any deficiency, nevertheless a mortgage is a
voluntarily contracted obligation and when the mortgagee
has compelled one sale he has obtained all he contracted
to receive. The note concludes (page 148):
The effect of foreclosure and sale is to extinguish the mortgage lien; therefore, when the
mortgagor redeems, the redeemed lands will not
be subject to that particular lien.
In Lightcap vs. Bradley (1900, 186 111. 510, 58 NE
221, the Court said:
It is true that if the premises are redeemed by
the mortgagor they become like any other property owned by him and may be subject to execution for sale on a deficiency; but that is because
they belong to the debtor and not on account of
any lien by virtue of the mortgage. A redemption
by any person not liable for the debt would free
them absolutely, so that they could not even be
levied upon by execution for a deficiency.
In Makibben vs. Arndt, 88 Ky. 180, 10 SW 642, the
Court said:
13
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Petitioner (a mortgagee holding a deficiency
judgment) contends that redemption from the
sale left the unsatisfied portion of his judgment
in full force against the property. This contention
" is based upon the fact that the statute declares
*•-• the sale "null and void" from the time of redemption. We cannot assent to it. His lien was of contract. The legal title to the property was merely
in pledge to him for payment of his debt and in
pledge for what it might bring, merely, when sold.
<>;* * # * he cannot sell, resell, and sell again * * *.
The redemption is the recovery of the legal title.
The mortgage lien ceases to exist whenever the
sale is made enforcing it. * * * The parties to the
mortgage contract understand at its inception that
the property is liable to be sold once by virtue of
it; and it is not for a court to make a contract for
them of greater continuing force. Its right and
power to sell is based upon the mortgage lien
alone and one exercise of that power is an exhaustion of it.
Using almost the same language is Fields vs. Danenhower, 65 Ark. 392, 46 SW 938, 43 LEA 519, which makes
the pertinent observation that if the mortgage lien survived (as Defendants here claim it should) then how
would it be consistent for the mortgagee to have a genral execution on all of the mortgagor's property for his
deficiency judgment, because the mortgage foreclosure
would never be complete and there is never a right to
a deficiency judgment until it has been determined how
much the property will bring at foreclosure sale.
This (the Arkansas) rule falls precisely within
Utah's specific mortgage foreclosure procedure statute,
78-27-2 UCA 1953, and the cases annotated thereunder.
One such case is the 'Raymond decision which we now
discuss.

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Utah Supreme Court has never been precisely
confronted with the entire issue presented in this case,
but on various ingredients of it which have come before
it, this Court has been uniformly in accord with the view
expressed by California, Oregon, Washington, Montana,
Nevada, Illinois, Kentucky, and Arkansas. For example,
in First National Bank vs. Raymond, 89 XL 158, 57 P2d
1401 (1936) this Court not only held that the mortgaged
property must be sold and the proceeds derived from the
sale thereof applied to the payment of the obligation before a deficiency judgment may be entered against any
of those liable for payment of the debt, but also held:
If the property does not sell for enough to discharge the debt secured, deficiency judgment
must be docketed by the clerk for such deficiency
against the persons liable for the payment of the
obligation if personally served with summons, and
execution may issue for such deficiency as in the
case of other judgments.
Thus, the trial court has finished its duties with
respect to foreclosure proceedings when the decree of foreclosure and the order of sale are entered. (Emphasis added)
?To require the mortgagee to accept the mortgaged
property in lieu of the money which the mortgagors have agreed to pay would be to make a contract for the parties contrary to their agreement.
This the courts may not do. (Cf. Ulrich vs. Lincoln Realty, 175 P2d 199, in which it is held that
when a mortgagee has had the property sold for
the amount of the mortgage debt and has been
willing to accept the amount thus bid, even though
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it might be less than the total indebtedness, the
mortgagee has received all he contracted for in
the mortgage.)
The Haymond case goes on to say that provisions
of the Utah Law are calculated to protect from injury
the mortgagor and others who may have an interest in
the property :
u

If the mortgagee or other purchaser bids in the
property for less than its value, such mortgagee
or purchaser may he deprived of all anticipated
profit by redemption.

Walker Bank, when it caused the clerk to issue an
Execution on February 12, 1973, was well aware that its
mortgage (or Trust Deed) had spent its force. If Walker
Bank had been proceeding, or had intended to proceed,
in the continuation of its specific mortgage lien, it would
have obtained from the Court an "Order of Sale" or a
"Special Execution" as required by Section 78-37-1 UCA
1953, which provides, in the last sentence:
'-;••* * * and a Special Execution or Order of Sale
shall be issued for that purpose.
And a "Special Execution" is an Order of Sale directed
to specifically described property (Words and Phrases,
Vol. 39A,p.211).
Walker Bank was cautious to avoid any attempt to
revive or resurrect its mortgage (B. 25, 26).
The Federal Circuit Court case of Barry vs. Harnesberger (CCA 7th 148 F. 346) held in a mortgage foreclosure case under a statute of Illinois that the lien of a
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deficiency could not attach until the property was sold,
that the redemption having "destroyed the lien of the
mortgage" the lien of the deficiency judgment "could
only attach to the property of the original mortgagors,
whose interest in the land was terminated, of course,
with their conveyance to the appellants".
As all these authorities declare, the lien must attach
to property in the name of the judgment debtor at a time
when he holds title to the subject property. This condition
never did obtain in the Walker Bank deficiency judgment
proceedings under which Moessers claim to have acquired
their interests.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT
NEITHER SPAULDING'S REDEMPTION NOR THE
THEORY OF CONTINUATION OF WALKER
BANK'S LIEN GAVE THE SHERIFF ANYTHING
TO SELL TO MOESSER.

Since the several points stated by Appellant are all
effectively disposed of if this Court follows the rule well
established by the foregoing decisions, we have elected
to treat all four of those points subordinately within this
Point II, and as sub-headings (A) through (D),
(A) THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS OF WALKER BANK DID NOT DISCHARGE ANY
RIGHTS OF CLAWSON IN THE PROPERTY.

This misapprehension pervasive throughout Defendants' brief is that Clawson was a " junior lienholder" or
in some way a lien claimant having an encumbrance or
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claim on the title subordinate to Walker Bank. This is
simply contrary to the facts: Clawson was the owner of
the land; subject only to the lien of Walker Bank?s Trust
Deed. (See table at page 6).
That lien was subject to satisfaction by Clawson,
Spaulding, Mid-Continent, or by anyone else who may
have had an interest in the land — and in any way that
mortgages, trust deeds, or other liens may be discharged.
One way is for the mortgage to be foreclosed and the
property sold and thereafter redeemed from sale {Flanders vs.Aumack, 32 Ore. 19, 51 P 447). When a party
has foreclosed a mortgage and had the property once
sold to satisfy it, he has obtained all he contracted for
(Ulrich vs. Lincoln Realty Co., 175 P2d 149). A redemption will never reinstate a specific mortgage lien (Flanders vs. Aumack, supra). Clawson and Walker Bank
were never competing interests. One had title, the other
had a mortgage.
Walker Bank could only have a general execution,
after the mortgage was totally expired. Under any other
rule it could have no right to pursue personal property,
supplemental proceedings, or anything else, until the
second, or third, or fourth mortgage foreclosure aales
were held. We submit Walker Bank had this well in mind
and elected, correctly and inevitably, to claim by general
execution rather than by another Order of Sale.
(B) THE REDEMPTION BY C. H. SPAULDING,
ALTHOUGH VALID, COULD NOT REVIVE ANY
INTEREST IN HIMSELF SINCE HE HAD NO
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY.
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When Spaulding redeemed he did so as one permitted
by law to do so. Bule 69(f) (1) says the judgment debtor
may redeem. One can only speculate how he intended
to eliminate Clawson's interests; but it is certain that
Clawson held the title and that was a problem Spaulding
did not solve.
However — and this is particularly significant from
the standpoint not only of this case but also as a general
precedent — the Spaulding redemption made it impossible, as well as unnecessary, for anyone else to redeem.
What Defendants are saying is that by Spaulding's redemption Clawson was precluded from protecting his
title. That is equivalent to saying that a person who
wished to pay his taxes to obtain the benefit of protecting
himself against adverse possession could not do so even
though he tendered the payment well in advance of the
delinquency date if someone else had paid those taxes.
Spaulding's redemption made it impossible and unnecessary that Clawson redeem.
A redemption by one (Spaulding in this case) is a redemption for all who may be interested in the title.
The case cited on pages 12 and 13 of Appellants'
brief further illustrates the necessity to follow local
statutes on foreclosure and redemption and local decisions which interpret those statutes. The revealing
language in the McLean case is this:
* * * It thus appears that the statute and decision
law of Iowa recognizes an equity in the mortgagor
(who has lost title).
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Undoubtedly Iowa has a statute which justifies such
a conclusion. Utah, as we have pointed out hereinabove,
clearly does not. In fact, Utah's statute compels a result
directly to the contrary.
(C) WALKER BANK WAS NOT A JUNIOR LIENHOLDER — NO LIEN COULD ATTACH BECAUSE THIS DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT WAS
NOT AGAINST CLAWSON.

To the extent Defendants acknowledge that Walker
Bank had a deficiency judgment which took effect January 22, 1970 we are in agreement. But this judgment did
not, and could not, operate as a lien on this property.
As all the records show, and as the Defendants admit, Clawson was not personally bound by the judgment
(EL 46-48); in fact, the judgment does not even recite that
his interest is subordinate to the Walker Bank foreclosure
(R. 15-18). Although we recognize that Clawson was subject to a sale of the property one time, and one time only,
that sale was held and the mortgage (or trust deed) was
extinguished as a lien on the land.
On October 25, 1968, Clawson, who was then the
owner of the property (his Sheriff's Deed was recorded
October 20, 1968) stipulated with Walker Bank that the
Trust Deed had the higher priority. The stipulation in
full verbatim, reads:
Come now the Defendants James Gr. Clawson and
Joan M. Clawson and by and through their attorney, Tex E. Olsen, and hereby stipulate that the
Plaintiffs' Trust Deed has priority over any right,
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title, or interest of said Defendants in said property and the interest of the Defendants was acquired subsequent to the filing of said interest
by the Plaintiff.
Beyond saying that the Walker Bank Trust Deed
was of record when Clawson received title, this stipulation says and does absolutely nothing. It permits Walker
Bank to proceed to sell the property — but once and only
once, as the cases unanimously hold, and if it can be redeemed from sale then the trust deed (mortgage) is exhausted.
In fact, under all those cases cited above and even
those cited by the Defendants, even if Clawson had acquired title from Spaulding after the decree of foreclosure and after the sale, the title would have stayed
with Clawson and a redemption would have extricated
it from the trust deed.
The stipulation does not have the effect of enlarging
the rights of Walker Bank under its trust deed, nor of
writing a new contract between the parties. It does no
more than acknowledge existing, undisputed facts and
permit the foreclosure action to proceed without controversy concerning dates.
In short, the stipulation does not repeal existing law.
(D) CLAWSON'S INTERESTS WERE NOT FORECLOSED BY ANY WALKER BANK PROCEEDINGS.

The cases (and text authority) cited by Moessers
at pages 14 through 17 of their brief to the effect that a
redemption revives the mortgage are not under statutes
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like ours. New York is the only jurisdiction cited, and
the principal holding begins with the language "by the
very terms of this enactment * * *" meaning that a New
York statute permits survival. The same is true of the
0shorn on Mortgages citation, which begins "the cases
holding *'* *" and ending with the New York citation.
Defendants' Points III and IV may be dispositively answered by the fact that Clawson was not a "junior lienholder". Clawson owned title. He had purchased
it four months before Walker Bank began foreclosure
proceedings and took a deed from the Sheriff before the
stipulation was entered into.
It would be repetitious to cite the many holdings
which say a redemption removes the effect of a sale and
title stays where it was or would have been had the sale
not taken place.
A mortgage foreclosure could defeat the title, if unredeemed from a sale, but a redemption occurred so it
is unproductive to discuss alteration of the chain of title
when a sale is vitiated by redemption by anyone.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully conclude this brief with the summan that Utah's Statutes, like Montana's, Washington's,
Nevada's, and other states', destroy the lien of a mortgage once the mortgage has operated to sell the property.
7

Utah, as well as her sister states, borrowed the controlling statute from California which had so ruled in
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1878. All other states have accepted California's rule
not only because the legislature is presumed to have
borrowed California Law impressed with judicial interpretation upon it, but also because those judicial interpretations are sound, provide just economic results and,
equally important, observe the law of contracts between
parties.
For those reasons the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Ken Chamberlain
Olsen and Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Attorneys for Respondents.
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